Abstract. A Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Proxy Re-Encryption (CP-ABPRE) employs the PRE technology in the attribute-based encryption cryptographic setting, in which the proxy is allowed to convert an encryption under an access policy to another encryption under a new access policy. CP-ABPRE is applicable to many real world applications, such as network data sharing. The existing CP-ABPRE systems, however, leave how to achieve adaptive CCA security as an interesting open problem. This paper, for the first time, proposes a new CP-ABPRE to tackle the problem by integrating the dual system encryption technology with selective proof technique. The new scheme supports any monotonic access structures. Although our scheme is built in the composite order bilinear group, it is proven adaptively CCA secure in the standard model without jeopardizing the expressiveness of access policy.
Introduction
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) [10, 21] , which is a generalization of Public Key Encryption (PKE), provides flexibility of data sharing for system users such that a data encryptor is allowed to specify some descriptive values x for an encryption and thus, the encryption can be decrypted successfully by a secret key associated with some descriptive values y matching x. ABE has many applications, such as audit log applications [10] . It usually has two classifications: Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE) and Ciphertext-Policy ABE (CP-ABE). In a KP-ABE system, ciphertexts are associated with attribute sets and secret keys are associated with access policies. However, CP-ABE is complementary. This paper deals with the case of CP-ABE.
In a cloud storage system, a user, say Alice, may encrypt a data under a specified access policy such that other system users satisfying this policy can access the data. She might encrypt her profile under a policy AP 1 = ("Department : Human Resource" and "P osition : T eam manager or above") before uploading to the cloud. The system users satisfying AP 1 then can download the ciphertext from the cloud, and next access the data by using the corresponding secret keys. This data sharing pattern, nonetheless, does not scale well when the policy needs to be updated frequently. Suppose the policy above is updated as AP 2 = ("Department : Human Resource or M aterials Storage" and "P osition : T eam manager only"), Alice then should generate a new encryption accordingly. If Alice does not back up the data locally, she needs to download the ciphertext so as to recovers the data first. If the access policy is updated N times, Alice needs to construct N new encryptions. This might not be desirable as Alice's workload is linearly in N . Besides, if she is off-line or using some resource-limited devices which cannot afford such heavy computational cost, the data sharing might not be handled effectively.
To efficiently share data, we may leverage Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE). PRE is introduced by Mambo and Okamoto [19] , and further studied by Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss [5] . It is an interesting extension of PKE providing the delegation of decryption rights. Specifically, it allows a semitrusted proxy to transform a ciphertext intended for Alice into another ciphertext of the same plaintext intended for another system user, say Bob, without revealing knowledge of the secret keys and the underlying plaintext. It is applicable to many network applications, such as secure distributed files systems [1] and email forwarding [5] .
To integrate PRE in the ABE cryptographic setting, Liang et al. [16] defined Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based PRE (CP-ABPRE), and proposed a concrete CP-ABPRE system enabling proxy to transform an encryption under a specified access policy into another encryption under a new access policy. We refer to this special functionality as attribute-based re-encryption. By using the technology of CP-ABPRE, Alice can share the data more efficiently. She first generates a re-encryption key from her own attribute set to a new access policy AP 2 , and next uploads the key to the cloud such that the cloud server then can convert the original encryption under AP 1 to a new encryption under AP 2 . The server, nevertheless, cannot learn the data during the conversion of cipehrtexts.
Although CP-ABPRE explores the applications of PRE, they leave us interesting open problems. All the existing CP-ABPRE schemes in the literature are secure against selective chosen-plaintext attacks (selective CPA) only except [15] which is selective chosen-ciphertext attacks (selective CCA) secure. We state that CPA security might not be sufficient enough in an open network as it only guarantees the secrecy of data which only allows an encryption to be secure against "static" adversaries. Nevertheless, in a real network scenario, there might exist "active" adversaries trying to tamper an encryption in transit and next observing its decryption so as to obtain useful information related to the underlying data. Accordingly, a CP-ABPRE system being secure against CCA is needed as CCA security not only helps the system preclude the above subtle attacks but also enables the system to be further developed and next securely "embedded" to a large protocol/system implementing in arbitrary network environments. In addition, a CP-ABPRE system with selective security, which limits an adversary to choose an attack target before playing security game, might not scale in practice as well. This is so because a realistic adversary can adaptively choose his attack target upon attacking a cryptosystem. Therefore, an adaptively CCA secure CP-ABPRE scheme is needed in most of practical network applications.
The expressiveness of access policy is another crucial factor for a practical CP-ABPRE system. An access policy should be embedded with AN D, OR gates, and even more meaningful expression. For instance, Alice might choose to share her profile with some officials of the same company under the access policy AP 3 = ("Department : allexcept Human Resource" and "P osition : P roject head or team manager"). Nevertheless, most of the existing CP-ABPRE schemes only support access policy with AN D gates operating over attributes. This limits their practical use. Thus it is desirable to propose a CP-ABPRE system supporting more expressive access policy.
Our Contributions
This work first formalizes the notion of adaptive CCA security for CP-ABPRE systems. Compared to the selective CPA security notion, our new notion enables an adversary to commit to a target access policy in the challenge phase, and to gain access to re-encryption and decryption oracles additionally. To tackle the open problems mentioned previously, this paper proposes a novel single-hop unidirectional CP-ABPRE system. In addition, the new system supports any monotonic access policy such that system users are allowed to fulfill more flexible delegation of decryption rights. Despite our scheme is built in the composite order bilinear group, it is proven adaptively CCA secure in the standard model by integrating the dual system encryption technology with the selective proof technique.
Related Work
Below we review some ABE systems related to this work. Following the introduction of ABE due to Sahai and Waters [21] , Goyal et al. [10] proposed the first KP-ABE system. Later, Bethencourt, Sahai and Waters [4] defined a complementary notion, i.e. CP-ABE. After that there are some CP-ABE schemes (e.g. [7, 9, 22, 2] ) that have been proposed. Recently, Waters [23] proposed a deterministic finite automata-based functional encryption where policy is expressed by arbitrary-size regular language.
The aforementioned schemes, nonetheless, are only selective secure (except for [4] being proven in the generic group model). To convert one of the CP-ABE systems [22] to achieve fully security, Lewko et al. [13] leveraged the dual system encryption technology. But their conversion yields some loss of expressiveness. Later, Lewko and Waters [14] introduced a new method to guarantee the expressiveness by employing the selective proof technique into the dual system encryption technology. Inspired by [14, 22] , this paper focuses on constructing the first CP-ABPRE with adaptive CCA security in the standard model.
Decryption rights delegation is introduced in [19] . Later, Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss [5] defined PRE. PRE can be classified as: unidirectional and bidirectional PRE, and single-hop and multi-hop PRE [1] . This present work deals with the single-hop unidirectional case. Since its introduction many PRE systems have been proposed, e.g., [1, 6, 12, 17, 11, 24, 25, 26] .
To employ PRE in the context of ABE, Liang et al. [16] defined CP-ABPRE, and further extended [7] to support proxy re-encryption. Their work provides AN D gates over positive and negative attributes. Luo et al. [18] proposed an extension of [16] supporting policy with AN D gates on multi-valued and negative attributes. To combine ABE with IBE by using PRE technique, Mizuno and Doi [20] proposed a special type of CP-ABPRE scheme where encryptions in the form of ABE can be converted to the ones being decrypted in the context of IBE. The previously introduced systems, however, are selectively CPA secure, and their policies are lack of expressiveness due to supporting AN D gates over attributes only. Thus an adaptively CCA-secure CP-ABPRE scheme with more expressive access policy remains open. This paper deals with this problem.
Below we compare this work with some CP-ABPRE schemes. We let p be the number of attributes used in an access policy, a be the number of attributes embedded in a user's secret key and u be the total number of attributes used in the system. In the worst case, an access policy and a user's secret key might be embedded with all system attributes, that is p = a = u. Thus we have p, a ≤ u. We use c e and c p to denote the computational cost of an exponentiation and a bilinear pairing. To the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the first to achieve adaptive CCA security, and to support any monotonic access formula. 
! ! 2 Definitions and Security Models
We review the definition of CP-ABPRE systems, and next define the adaptive CCA security notion. Due to limited space we refer the reader to [22] for the details of access structure and Linear Secret Sharing Schemes.
Definition of CP-ABPRE
We review the definition of single-hop unidirectional CP-ABPRE [16, 18] . Definition 1. A Single-Hop Unidirectional Ciphertext-Policy AttributeBased Proxy Re-Encryption (CP-ABPRE) scheme consists of the following algorithms:
on input a security parameter k ∈ N and an attribute universe U, output the public parameters param and a master secret key msk. 2. sk S ← KeyGen(param, msk, S): on input param, msk and an attribute set S describing the key, output a secret key sk S for S. 3. rk S→(A ,ρ ) ← ReKeyGen(param, sk S , (A , ρ )): on input param, sk S , and an access structure (A , ρ ) for attributes over U, output a reencryption key rk S→(A ,ρ ) which can be used to transform a ciphertext under (A, ρ) to another ciphertext under (A , ρ ), where S |= (A, ρ), S (A , ρ ), (A, ρ) and (A , ρ ) are two disjoint access structures. Note by two disjoint access structures we mean for any attribute x satisfies (A, ρ), x does not satisfy (A , ρ ).
, and a message m ∈ {0, 1} k , output an original ciphertext C which can be further re-encrypted. Note (A, ρ) is implicitly included in the ciphertext. 
A continues making queries except the followings:
(a) O sk (S) for any S |= (A * , ρ * ); (b) O rk (S, (A , ρ )) for any S |= (A * , ρ * ), and O sk (S ) for any S |= (A , ρ ); (c) O re (S, (A , ρ ), C * ) for any S |= (A * , ρ * ), and O sk (S ) for any S |= (A , ρ ); (d) O dec (S, C * ) for any S |= (A * , ρ * ); and (e) O dec R (S, C R ) for any C R under (A, ρ), S |= (A, ρ), where C R is a derivative of C * . As of [6] , the derivative of C * is defined as: i. C * is a derivative of itself. ii. If A has issued a re-encryption key query on (S * , (A , ρ ) 
a derivative of C * , where S * |= (A * , ρ * ) and S |= (A , ρ ). iii. If A has issued a re-encryption query on (S, (A , ρ ), C * ) and obtained the re-encrypted ciphertext C R , then C R is a derivative of C * , where S |= (A * , ρ * ). 
where (A, ρ) and (A * , ρ * ) are disjoint, (A * , ρ * ) is the challenge access structure, Remarks. Definition 3 implies collusion resistance. If A can compromise sk S * from either rk S * →(A,ρ) or rk S→(A * ,ρ * ) , A wins the game with nonnegligible probability, where S |= (A, ρ), S * |= (A * , ρ * ) and sk S is given.
3 An Adaptively CCA-Secure CP-ABPRE
Construction
Due to limited space we review composite order bilinear groups, complexity assumptions, and one-time symmetric encryption in Appendix A.
, a CCA-secure one-time symmetric encryption system SY M and a strongly existential unforgeable onetime signature system [3] OT S. For each attribute i ∈ U, choose
, and the msk is (g α , g 3 ), where g 3 is a generator of G p 3 . 2. KeyGen(param, msk, S). Choose t, u ∈ R Z N , R, R , R , {R i } i∈S ∈ R G p 3 , and set the secret key sk S as
3. Encrypt(param, (A, ρ), m). Given an LSSS access structure (A, ρ) and a message m ∈ G T in which A is an l × n matrix and ρ is a map from each row A j to an attribute ρ(j),
and set
Note {ρ(j)|1 ≤ j ≤ l} are the attributes used in (A, ρ).
, and the re-encryption key rk S→(A ,ρ ) as (rk 1 , rk 2 , rk 3 , rk 4 , ∀i ∈ S rk 5,i , rk 6 ).
(a) Check the validity of the original ciphertext C as
where w j are chosen by the proxy so that ρ(j)∈S w j A j = (1, 0, ..., 0). If Eq. (1) does not hold, output ⊥. Otherwise, proceed.
, and the secret key sk S as (S, K, K , K , ∀i ∈ S K i ). The decryption algorithm chooses a set of constants w j ∈ R Z N such that ρ(j)∈S w j A j = (1, 0, ..., 0), and next recovers the message as follows. g) αs , and output the message m = B 0 /e(g, g) αs . 7. Dec R (param, sk S , C R ). Parse the re-encrypted ciphertext C R under (A , ρ ) as (σ 1 , σ 2 ), and the secret key sk S as (S, K, K , K , ∀i ∈ S K i ).
(a) Check the validity of σ 2 as
1 , B
3 ,
where w g) αs (re) , and output key = B ,ĝ
where w (rk) j are chosen by the decryptor so that ρ (j)∈S w
, and then B (rk) 0 /e(g, g) αs (rk) = δ. Compute F T CR 1 (δ) −1 = e(g, g) αs , and finally output m = B 0 /e(g, g) αs .
Security Analysis
Theorem 1. Suppose Assumption 1, the general subgroup decision assumption, the three party Diffie-Hellman assumption in a subgroup, and the source q-parallel BDHE assumption in a subgroup hold, SY M is a CCA-secure one-time symmetric encryption, OT S is a strongly existential unforgeable one-time signature, and T CR 1 , T CR 2 are the TCR hash functions, our system is IND-CCA secure in the standard model. We prove our scheme by following [14] . Due to limited space, we present our construction for semi-functional ciphertexts and semi-functional keys in the full version.
We will prove Theorem 1 in a hybrid argument over a sequence of games. We let the total number of queries be q = q sk + q rk + q re + q dec , where q sk , q rk , q re , q dec denote the number of the secret key, re-encryption key, re-encryption and decryption queries, respectively. Game real is the first game that is the IND-CCA security game for CP-ABPRE systems in which the challenge ciphertext (original ciphertext/re-encrypted ciphertext) is normal. Here, C will use normal secret keys to respond secret key extraction queries. Besides, C will first generate normal secret keys, and next leverage these keys to respond the re-encryption key, re-encryption and decryption queries, namely, the re-encryption keys, re-encryption results and decryption results are indirectly computed from the normal secret keys. Game 0 is the second game which is identical to Game real except that the challenge ciphertext is semi-functional.
Hereafter by "keys" (resp. "key") we mean the secret key(s) (constructed by C) used to respond the secret key extraction, re-encryption key extraction, re-encryption and decryption queries. In the following, we will convert the "keys" to be semi-functional one by one. But for clarity we first turn the "keys" for the secret key extraction queries, and then convert the "keys" for the re-encryption key queries, the re-encryption queries and the decryption queries in sequence. Besides, A issues one query in each of the following games. We define Game i as follows, where i ∈ [1, q]. We let j τ ∈ [1, q τ ], where τ ∈ {sk, rk, re, dec}. In Game jτ we define two sub-games Game N jτ and Game T jτ in which the challenge ciphertext is semifunctional. In Game N jτ the first (j − 1) τ "keys" are semi-functional, the j τ -th "key" is nominal semi-functional, and the rest of "keys" are normal. In Game T jτ the first (j − 1) τ "keys" are semi-functional, the j τ -th "key" is temporary semi-functional, and the remaining "keys" are normal.
To transform Game (j−1)τ (where j τ -th "key" is normal) to Game jτ (where j τ -th "key" is semi-functional) , we first convert Game (j−1)τ to Game N jτ , then to Game T jτ , and finally to Game jτ . To get from Game N jτ to Game T jτ , we treat the simulations for the queries of Phase 1 and that of Phase 2 differently: the former is based on the three party Diffie-Hellman assumption, and the latter is based on the source group q-parallel BDHE assumption. In Game q = Game q dec all "keys" are semi-functional, and the challenge ciphertext is semi-functional for one of the given messages. Game f inal is the final game where all "keys" are semi-functional and the challenge ciphertext is semi-functional for a random message, independent of the two message given by A. We will prove the above games to be indistinguishable by the following lemmas. Note we implicitly assume SY M is a CCA-secure one-time symmetric encryption, OT S is a strongly existential unforgeable one-time signature, T CR 1 , T CR 2 are TCR hash functions and it is hard to find a non-trivial factor of N (for Lemma 3 and Lemma 4). Due to limited space, we will provide the proofs of the lemmas in the full version of this paper.
Conclusions
This paper defined the IND-CCA security notion for CP-ABPRE systems, and proposed the first adaptively CCA-secure CP-ABPRE scheme without loss of expressiveness on access policy by integrating the dual system encryption technology with selective proof technique. Following the proof framework introduced by Lewko and Waters, our scheme was proved in the standard model. This paper also motivates interesting open problems, such as, converting our system in the prime order bilinear group.
